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I. INTRODUCTION
Government employees have a fundamental right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures;1 however, that right is not abso-
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment applies to searches con-
ducted by government employers on their employees, see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 715 (1987), government searches of private citizens, see United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), and police searches of criminal suspects, see
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).  This Note is primarily concerned
with the privacy interests of government employees; the privacy interest at issue
for private citizens or criminal suspects may be different.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB204.txt unknown Seq: 3 30-NOV-11 8:10
2011] DID MY BOSS JUST READ THAT? 561
lute.  Courts have granted government employees’ Fourth Amend-
ment protection over their offices,2 drug and alcohol urine testing,3
and personal computers storing work-related files.4  On the other
hand, courts have not extended Fourth Amendment protection from
government employers searching files downloaded to employees’ work
computers over the work-provided internet server5 and documents
stored in a locked file cabinet in the employees’ offices.6
One basic question that must be answered in any Fourth Amend-
ment analysis is, first and foremost, whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to the search at issue.  In Katz v. United States,7 Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion outlined the prevailing two-part test to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a search or
seizure: (1) the individual must have a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy, and (2) that expectation of privacy must be one that society is
ready to recognize as reasonable.8  This test is a balancing test, weigh-
ing the government employee’s liberty interest in freedom from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures against the government interest in
conducting the search.9  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given
little guidance in how lower courts should weigh these two interests.
With the rapidly increasing prevalence of cell phones, e-mail, and
other forms of electronic communication,10 courts are forced to answer
the question of whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in electronic communication devices.  Courts increasingly face
situations where public employers search their employees’ work-pro-
vided communication devices, and the employees claim a violation of
an expectation of privacy.11
Historically, the Court has distinguished information available to
third parties from information intended only for the recipient’s eyes,
which the sender attempted to keep secret from others.  In 1877, the
Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment to sealed letters sent
via the United States Postal Service.12  In Ex parte Jackson, the Su-
preme Court determined an individual who mails a letter has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the content of the sealed letter; on
2. E.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
3. E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
4. E.g., Sabin v. Miller, 423 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
5. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
6. Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997).
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9. Id.
10. AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, CELL PHONES AND AMERICAN ADULTS
(Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/
2010/PIP_Adults_Cellphones_Report_2010.pdf [hereinafter CELL PHONE USAGE].
11. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
12. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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the other hand, the individual has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the addressing information on the outside of the envelope.13
In 1979, the Court applied a similar distinction in determining an in-
dividual does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content
of telephone calls, but not the number he or she has dialed.14  With
technology advancing, the question has arisen of whether a similar
distinction should apply to determine the reasonableness of a privacy
interest attached to electronic communications.15
The United States Supreme Court faced this question in City of
Ontario v. Quon,16 in which the Court held the Fourth Amendment
does not protect an employee’s text messages from a public employer’s
search.17  Quon, a police officer in the City of Ontario, claimed his su-
pervisors violated his reasonable expectation of privacy when they
searched the content of his text messages sent on his employer-pro-
vided text messaging pager.18  The Court declined to determine
whether Quon, and by extension other public employees, would have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in such devices.19  Instead, the
Court determined that, regardless of Quon’s expectation of privacy,
the City of Ontario was reasonable in searching the pager.20
This Note begins by exploring the relevant history of the Fourth
Amendment search and seizure provision as applied to communica-
tions and government employers.  Part III discusses the Court’s oppor-
tunity in Quon to apply a set standard to text messages, and argues
the Court should make more definitive statements determining gov-
ernment employees’ privacy interests in the future.  Part IV gives rec-
ommendations for lower courts in handling the nebulous area left by
the decision in Quon.  The Court should follow the standard first es-
poused in Ex parte Jackson: individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the content of their text messages, but not the addressing
information.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fourth Amendment Protections of Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment states the following: “The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
13. Id. at 733.
14. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
15. Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier
of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 186 (2010).
16. 130 S. Ct. 2619.
17. Id. at 2632.
18. Id. at 2626.
19. Id. at 2630.
20. Id.
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”21  This
protects individuals from unreasonable government intrusion into cer-
tain areas.22  The Supreme Court has faced comparable issues in de-
termining what possessions or areas the Fourth Amendment
protects.23
1. Katz and Smith: Adoption of the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Standard
In Katz v. United States, the Court analyzed whether the police
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures when they placed a wiretap on the
phone booth the defendant used.24  The police used the wiretap to re-
cord Katz’s private phone conversations.25  The Court concluded, even
though “the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional ‘right to privacy,’”26 it “protects people, not places.”27
Katz demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment protections may ap-
ply to government searches using electronic surveillance, not just a
physical intrusion.  The Court determined Katz had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his private telephone conversations, and thus a
recording of those conversations without the proper warrant was un-
constitutional.28  Katz purposely kept the content of his private con-
versations from being overheard by others when he closed the door to
the phone booth and therefore the Fourth Amendment protected the
content of his conversation.  Had Katz made his call from home, the
Fourth Amendment also would have protected the content of his
communications.29
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, outlined a two-part test
to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a government
search: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”30  Thus, the test involves
a subjective and objective standard for the expectation of privacy.  For
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. For an overview of the protection the Fourth Amendment provides citizens, see
Investigation and Police Practices, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 3–19
(2006).
23. For example, the Supreme Court has determined an individual’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the individual’s vehicle in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710
(2009) and whether an electronic monitoring signal constitutes a search in United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 350.
27. Id. at 351.
28. Id. at 359.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Justice Harlan, even if an individual subjectively expected to keep his
conversations private, if the conversation was held out in the open the
Fourth Amendment would not apply because the expectation of pri-
vacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.31  Even though
the defendant’s recorded conversations took place in a phone booth,
which is technically a public place, the phone booth was “a tempora-
rily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of free-
dom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”32
In analyzing expectation of privacy issues for communications,
courts have emphasized a difference in the expectation of privacy in
the content of the communication and the expectation of privacy in the
coding information of the communication.33  “Coding information”
most often refers to the address or phone number of the intended re-
cipient.34  Since 1877, the Court has maintained that there is a differ-
ence between the expectation of privacy in information that is
necessarily shared with others and that which is kept hidden: “Letters
and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and
weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in
their own domiciles.”35  In Ex parte Jackson, the Court made a distinc-
tion between the content of a letter sealed in an envelope and sent
through the mail and other mailed content, such as newspapers, pam-
phlets, and magazines that are purposefully not sealed and open to
examination.36
In Smith v. Maryland,37 the police attempted to obtain evidence in
a criminal investigation against a suspect by surveying the suspect’s
telephone.38  The police placed a pen register on the defendant’s phone
line via the phone service provider to record all phone numbers dialed
from that phone line.39 Smith adds two points to the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis of electronic communications.  First, the Court high-
lighted the difference between coding information (addressing) and
content information.40  For the Court, a chief distinction between the
defendant in Smith and the defendant in Katz was the use of the pen
register, because pen registers do not record the contents of communi-
cations, just the addressing information.41  The defendant in Smith
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. E.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
34. Id. at 733.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
38. Id. at 737.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 741–42.
41. Id. at 741.
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did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers
he dialed because, although he dialed the numbers in the privacy of
his own home, the police only obtained a record of the phone numbers
dialed (i.e., the addressing information).  The Court noted that the  de-
fendant, and other reasonable home phone subscribers, should know
that such information is already shared with the phone service pro-
vider.42  Second, Smith was the first case in which a majority of the
Court relied on Justice Harlan’s two-part “reasonable expectation of
privacy” analysis for Fourth Amendment claims, requiring an analysis
of both the subjective expectation of privacy and the objective reasona-
bleness of the privacy interest.43
2. The Fourth Amendment Protects Searches of Government
Employees by Their Employers
Although Katz and Smith involved violations of a Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures per-
formed by the police in the midst of a criminal investigation, the
Fourth Amendment applies to all state and federal actors—including
government employers.44  In O’Connor v. Ortega,45 the Court estab-
lished that a public sector employee can have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his place of work, stating, “Individuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government in-
stead of a private employer.”46  In O’Connor, Dr. Ortega, a public hos-
pital employee, claimed a violation of his right to freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures when the hospital searched his
office while he was out on administrative leave.47  A majority of the
Court agreed Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
locked office.48  The Court, however, was divided as to which test to
apply when government employees bring claims against their employ-
ers under § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations.49
The plurality opinion, written by Justice O’Connor, used an opera-
tional realities test: “The operational realities of the workplace, how-
ever, may make some employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable
when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement
official.”50  An examination of the operational realities of the work-
place requires a fact-based inquiry into the specific workings of the
workplace, including societal expectations and actual office practices
42. Id. at 742.
43. Id. at 740.
44. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
45. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
46. Id. at 717.
47. Id. at 713–14.
48. Id. at 719.
49. Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 717 (majority opinion).
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or procedures.51  For the plurality, “the question whether an employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-
by-case basis.”52  This would entail Justice Harlan’s two-part reasona-
ble expectation of privacy analysis from his concurrence in Katz: the
employee must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the area or
thing, and that privacy must be one society is willing to see as reason-
able.53  Only then, if the Court finds a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, would the Court analyze the reasonableness of the search,
considering the day-to-day operations of the workplace.  Justice
O’Connor reasoned that the purpose of the search, at its inception,
would determine whether the search itself was unreasonable.54  A
workplace search is reasonable if the employer performed the search
either for a non-investigatory, work-related purpose, or for investiga-
tions of work-related misconduct.55
Justice Scalia instead advocated for a one-step analysis in his con-
curring opinion, which provided the fifth vote in favor of a reasonable
expectation of privacy.56  Justice Scalia believed the operational reali-
ties test would lead to more uncertainty.57  Under this one-step analy-
sis, it is unnecessary to determine the reasonableness of the
expectation of privacy, because whether the searcher is an employer
or a police officer is irrelevant to whether the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies, but is relevant to whether the area is protected.58  The Fourth
Amendment generally protects offices of government employees.59
The difference between the majority’s operational realities test and
Justice Scalia’s test is that Justice Scalia would forego an analysis of
the reasonable expectation of privacy and, instead, assume govern-
ment employees always have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their places of work.60
3. Advances in Electronic Communication: Application of the
Coding vs. Content Distinction
The Court’s articulation and adoption of the Katz reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test and the ruling that government employees
can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplace were
not completely determinative of all Fourth Amendment application is-
sues.  District and circuit courts have had to determine whether indi-
51. Id. at 718.
52. Id.
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
54. 480 U.S. at 725–26.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 730.
58. Id. at 731.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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viduals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in addresses of e-
mails sent and received,61 cell phone records,62 and the content of con-
versations held in a work office.63  In United States v. Forrester,64 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny a motion to
suppress information providing websites visited by Forrester and ad-
dresses from his sent and received e-mails.65  The court compared this
type of information to the information obtained from the use of a pen
register—it was merely addressing information, not a search of the
content of the information.66  On the Internet, the court reasoned, an
individual has a different expectation of privacy in the addresses of
the websites he visits or of the e-mail addresses of the people he e-
mails than the expectation of privacy he has in the content of those e-
mails.67
4. Government Employees and the Coding vs. Content
Distinction
Lower courts have relied on the distinction between the content of
communications and the coding information (or addressing informa-
tion) when analyzing Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy
claims for government employees’ communications.68  In Beckwith v.
Erie County Water Authority, the plaintiff claimed a Fourth Amend-
ment violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy because his em-
ployer had requested a copy of the plaintiff’s cell phone records.69
There the court reasoned that, because the employer had only de-
manded the addressing information of the phone numbers dialed, this
was analogous to the use of a pen register in Smith v. Maryland.70
Because cellular phone customers know the phone numbers they dial
are shared with the phone company, there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in those numbers.71
In contrast, courts have found a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the content of employees’ communications.72  For example, in
United States v. Hagarty, the Seventh Circuit found a government em-
ployee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the
61. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
62. Beckwith v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth., 413 F. Supp. 2d 214 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
63. United States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1968).
64. 512 F.3d 500.
65. Id. at 509.
66. Id. at 510.
67. Id.
68. Beckwith v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth., 413 F. Supp. 2d 214, 218 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
69. Id. at 218.
70. Id. at 224.
71. Id.
72. See United States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1968).
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conversations the employee had in his office.73  In Hagarty, the gov-
ernment employer had placed an electronic listening device in the em-
ployee’s office without first obtaining a warrant.74  A criminal trial
followed based on evidence obtained from that recording.75  On ap-
peal, the Seventh Circuit determined the employee did have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in those conversations.76  The Seventh
Circuit analogized private phone conversations in one’s office to the
phone conversation in a private phone booth in Katz: the key fact is
whether or not the individual, government employee, or private citi-
zen, sought to exclude the “uninvited ear.”77
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has determined employees may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the phone
calls they make from a work line.78  In Narducci v. Moore, the plaintiff
claimed a Fourth Amendment violation when his government em-
ployer placed a wiretap on his work phone.79  There, the city comptrol-
ler requested the city record all calls to and from the finance
department to monitor any harassing phone calls and to determine
whether the finance department employees were making personal
phone calls while at work.80  The Seventh Circuit, on review of a grant
of summary judgment in favor of the city employee, determined there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his phone calls
made on his work phone.81  The Seventh Circuit recognized that
O’Connor rejected a categorical denial of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions to government employees, and applied the operational realities
test to determine there was a genuine issue of material fact to the
reasonable expectation of privacy.82
The Supreme Court has not yet articulated one test that can be
applied to all forms of electronic communication.  With the technology
of communications quickly advancing,83 Courts have no bright-line
rule for evaluating government employees’ privacy expectations.
73. Id. at 718.
74. Id. at 714.
75. Id. at 715.
76. Id. at 719.
77. Id. at 716.
78. Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 2009).
79. Id. at 321.
80. Id. at 316.
81. Id. at 321.
82. Id. at 320.
83. See CELL PHONE USAGE, supra note 10.
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B. Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Address Expectation of
Privacy in Modern Electronic Communications in
City of Ontario v. Quon
1. Background and Procedural History
For the first time, the Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon
was faced with a government employer’s search of an employer-pro-
vided electronic device.84  The City of Ontario, California, issued a
team of police officers text messaging-enabled pagers to help facilitate
communication between the team members.85  The City’s text messag-
ing plan allowed for a certain number of characters to be sent on each
pager per month.86  The City had an official privacy policy that speci-
fied the City “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity
including e-mail and Internet use.”87  Although this policy did not ex-
plicitly cover the text messaging pagers, the City claimed that it held
an official meeting explaining that the policy did include the pagers,
and e-mailed an official memorandum to that effect.88
In the first or second billing cycle after the pagers were distributed,
Quon exceeded the allotted amount of characters on his pager.89
Quon testified that his supervisor, Lieutenant Steven Duke, told Quon
that as long as he paid the overage fees, the City would not audit
Quon’s text messages.90  Over the next several months, Quon again
exceeded the character limit three or four times.91  Lieutenant Duke
told his supervisor of the problem.92  In response, the City ordered an
audit of Quon’s and several other officers’ text messages to determine
whether the set monthly character limit was sufficient for work pur-
poses.93  The supervisor requested a printout of the officers’ text
messages for the previous months.94  After the service provider, Arch
Wireless, confirmed the City was the named subscriber on the plan,
the provider sent a printout of the text messages to the City.95
The City then redacted the text messages to only account for those
Quon had sent while he was on the clock.96  The City read Quon’s text
messages and found that a good number of them were not at all re-
lated to work; in fact many of Quon’s text messages were sexually ex-
84. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
85. Id. at 2625.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2626.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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plicit in nature, sent to both his wife and another City employee with
whom Quon was having an affair.97  The City then allegedly disci-
plined Quon for his unauthorized use of the pagers.98
After being disciplined, Quon, along with several other City em-
ployees, instituted a claim alleging a violation of a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy against both the City and Arch Wireless.99  The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the district court de-
nied the City’s motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amend-
ment claims.100  The district court determined Quon did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his text messages,
and held a jury trial to determine whether the search was reasonable
under O’Connor.101  The jury concluded Lieutenant Duke ordered the
audit to determine the effectiveness of the word limit, and the City did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.102
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his text
messages, and held that even though the search was conducted for a
legitimate work-related purpose, the search was not reasonable in
scope.103 The Court concluded there were less intrusive forms of de-
termining if the character limit for the pagers was sufficient, such as
only examining the numbers Quon exchanged messages with to deter-
mine whether Quon was communicating solely with colleagues.104
The City then petitioned for certiorari.
2. The City’s Search was Reasonable, Regardless of Whether
Quon Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the search
of Quon’s text messages was a violation of his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.105  Quon ar-
gued that the Court should uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision be-
cause his expectation of privacy in the text messages was reasonable
due to the lack of an official policy indicating the City had the right to
audit the text messages and the comments of his supervisor.106  The
City argued Quon did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
because of its memorandum and announcement made in a meeting
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1146 (C.D. Cal.
2006).
102. Id.
103. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899, 909 (9th Cir. 2008).
104. Id.
105. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
106. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
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indicating the privacy policy applied to the text messaging pagers.107
The City also asserted that, even if Quon’s expectation of privacy was
reasonable, the search of the text messages itself was reasonable be-
cause it was for a work-related purpose.108
Ultimately, the Court concluded that it did not matter whether
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his employer-issued
text messaging pager because the City’s search was justified at its in-
ception as a work-related, non-investigatory search.109  Because the
City audited the text messages sent on Quon’s pager to determine
whether the set limit was adequate, the search was reasonable.110
Therefore, the Court reasoned, it did not have to address the question
of whether Quon’s expectation of privacy was reasonable.111
In addition, the Court also ruled that the recipients of some of
Quon’s text messages, also plaintiffs in this case, did not have a
Fourth Amendment claim.112  The Court said that because these
plaintiffs largely based their claim on Quon’s argument, the additional
plaintiffs had no claim of invasion of privacy because the City’s search
of Quon’s text messages was reasonable.113
The Supreme Court declined to address the issue of whether Quon
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his employer-issued text
messaging pager.114  In doing so, the Court also declined to pick the
correct test of the two set forth in O’Connor.115  The Court could avoid
these two issues because of the facts unique to the Quon case: at least
according to the Court, it did not matter whether Quon had a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his pager because the City of Ontario’s
search of that pager was reasonable.
3. Scalia’s Concurrence: Should the Fourth Amendment Apply to
Messages Sent on Employer-Provided Devices?
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment that the search was not a
violation of Quon’s reasonable expectation of privacy; however, Justice
Scalia believed the question addressed should have been whether the
Fourth Amendment applies in general to messages sent on employer-
provided pagers, not just public employees’ pagers.116  This line of rea-
soning objected to the majority’s failure to address the question of pri-
vacy interests in text messaging pagers, because “[t]he-times-they-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2630 (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987)).
110. Id. at 2632.
111. Id. at 2630.
112. Id. at 2633.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2630.
115. Id. at 2628.
116. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”117  Justice
Scalia pointed out the majority’s advocating a case-by-case evaluation
of an electronic device to determine if the device is a necessary instru-
ment for self-expression would be extremely difficult to administer
objectively.118
III. ANALYSIS
At one time, the world’s main form of long distance communication
was the letter.  Later, individuals could communicate with a phone
call.  Today, people can communicate in an instant with others around
the world via e-mail, instant message, or text message.  Governments
and private citizens can clash over what privacy rights people have in
these different forms of electronic communications.119  In 1877, the
Court determined an individual has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the content of letters, but not the addressing information.120
More than a hundred years later, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court
decided citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
tent of their telephone calls but not the telephone numbers they
dial.121  In 2010, the Court failed to apply the same test to a newer
form of communication: text messages.122  Because more people are
using cellular devices, and the types of communication people use are
increasing,123 lower courts, private citizens, and government employ-
ers will need guidance on which test to apply to new and changing
devices.  If the Court had stuck to the coding vs. content distinction
first applied in Ex parte Jackson,124 there would have been one test to
cover all communication types.
With this increasing prevalence of cell phone use, courts will have
to determine whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in those devices.  Courts will need a definitive test to apply in
situations where government employees claim an expectation of pri-
vacy in their employer-provided electronic communication devices.
Additionally, public employers require guidance in implementing
searches and drafting company privacy policies.  In City of Ontario v.
Quon, the Court had the opportunity to definitively determine the ap-
117. Id. at 2635.
118. Id.
119. For a discussion of the history of criminal defendants claiming Fourth Amend-
ment protections over searches of their electronic communications, particularly
cell phone text messages, see Katharine M. O’Connor, :o OMG They Searched My
Txts: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
685, 701–15 (2010).
120. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
121. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
122. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
123. See CELL PHONE USAGE, supra note 10.
124. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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plicable test for reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic com-
munication.125  Instead, the Court determined, as usual, it is prudent
to avoid deciding constitutional issues when it is not absolutely neces-
sary, and consequently did not determine whether Quon had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his employer-issued text messaging
pager.126
The Court for the first time was faced with determining whether
the Fourth Amendment applies to electronic communication devices:
“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in so-
ciety has become clear.”127 The Supreme Court abstains from ruling
on constitutional issues unless deciding the issue is absolutely neces-
sary.128  According to the Court, it did not need to discuss the reasona-
bleness of Quon’s expectation of privacy in the content of his text
messages because the City’s search of the messages was reasona-
ble.129  In doing so, the Court avoided an ideal opportunity to explic-
itly adopt a test for electronic communication that has been in use for
over one hundred thirty years for other forms of communication: indi-
viduals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of com-
munications, but have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
addressing information.  While the facts of Quon did allow the Court
to avoid this analysis, the growing prevalence of employer-provided
electronic communication devices shows that courts will increasingly
be forced to face situations where they must analyze an employee’s
expectation of privacy in those devices.  When these issues arise,
courts should recognize that the Fourth Amendment should always
apply to government employers’ searches of the content of government
employees’ electronic communications.
A. Cell Phone Use Is on the Rise
The Pew Research Center reports that in November 2004, 65% of
United States adults owned a cell phone.130  In 2009, the updated
study found that 82% of adults own a cell phone, and one third of
adults who do not own a cell phone live in a house with someone else
who does.131  About the same percentage of adults own a computer—
79%.132  While all adults use their cell phones to make voice calls, 72%
of adults who own a cell phone also use their cell phone to send and
125. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 2629.
128. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
129. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
130. CELL PHONE USAGE, supra note 10, at 4.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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receive text messages, up from 58% of adult cell phone owners in
2007.133  This increase in use is extremely rapid, outpacing the spread
of availability of television and even overtaking fixed-line subscrib-
ers.134  On average, adults who text send about ten text messages per
day.135  The Supreme Court has recognized that “[c]ell phone and text
message communications are so pervasive that some persons may con-
sider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-
expression, even self-identification.”136
Increasingly, employers are turning to the ubiquity and usefulness
of cell phones and other devices to help improve their employees’ work
performance or output.  According to the Pew Research Center, 58%
percent of cell phone owners report making a work-related phone call
on their personal cellular device, and 32% of owners report making a
work-related phone call on their cell phone every day.137  Similarly,
49% of owners report sending a work-related text message on their
cell phone, with 21% reporting they do so at least once a day.138  Be-
cause of increasing work demands and travel requirements, many em-
ployers supply employees with cellular phones or personal digital
assistants to help facilitate work productivity.  Supplying employees
with a cellular phone or text messaging device is attractive for em-
ployers because it can help facilitate better work performance, make
employees more available after regular work hours, or help increase
employee productivity.  For example, the City of Ontario turned to the
use of text messaging pagers to help their SWAT team members better
communicate.139
Employer-provided text messaging pagers are not the only device
to which employers are turning.  Many employers provide employees
with a work e-mail address and Internet access while on the job.  With
the advent of SmartPhones such as Blackberries and iPhones, employ-
ees are now able to access the Internet wherever they are, further in-
creasing their availability and making the employer-provided
communication device that much more attractive to both employee
and employer.  It is estimated that 96% of American workers use tech-
nology in their work140 and 80% say the technology has improved
their ability to do their job.141
133. Id. at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 5.
136. City of Ontario v. Quon,130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
137. CELL PHONE USAGE, supra note 10, at 13.
138. Id. at 16.
139. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.
140. MARY MADDEN & SYDNEY JONES, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, NETWORKED WORKERS 4
(Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/
2008/PIP_Networked_Workers_FINAL.pdf.pdf.
141. Id. at 38.
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Eventually, this increase in use will lead to more court cases in-
volving an employee’s expectation of privacy in these devices.  Reason-
able expectation of privacy issues may be present in motions to
suppress in a criminal case or, like in Quon, in a § 1983 action for a
breach of reasonable search and seizure provision in the Constitu-
tion.142  Although only state and federal actors need to worry about
Fourth Amendment claims against them, private employers have
other concerns.  Many states143 have privacy laws restricting private
actors from obtaining others’ electronic communication, and the fed-
eral Stored Communications Act144 also applies to private actors.  Pri-
vate actors who violate state privacy laws can face civil liability or
criminal prosecution.145  These laws further support a rule that the
Fourth Amendment always applies when a government employer
searches government employees’ electronic communications because
legislatures have already found it reasonable to protect the content of
communications.
Courts will increasingly face a wide variety of claims, fact patterns,
and evolving technologies.  One potential issue for courts is how they
will deal with different devices.  Should courts establish one collective
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis for cell phones, laptops,
computers, internet usage, and e-mail; or should courts treat each of
these devices differently?  Ideally, courts should be able to establish
one method of analysis for all types of devices.  As the lines between
devices blur, such as with SmartPhones, the evolving nature of tech-
nology would require courts to constantly draft new tests as new de-
vices emerged if they had to treat each type of device differently.
Another potential problem with the increasing prevalence of work-
provided electronic devices is the blending of work use and personal
use.  Like in Quon, employees do not always use their employer-pro-
vided devices exclusively for work-related communications, which po-
tentially makes expectation of privacy claims more difficult.146
Alternatively, when employees use their own devices to communicate
for work purposes, expectation of privacy claims might also arise.  For
instance, if a state employee accesses his work-provided e-mail ad-
142. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.
143. For example, in Minnesota it is a gross misdemeanor for a person to enter, gaze
into, or install a device for observing in another person’s home. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.746 (West 2009).  Similarly, in Wisconsin an intrusion of privacy is defined
as including any intrusion that a reasonable person would find “highly offensive.”
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2007).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1–2) (2006).
145. For example, the Nebraska legislature has created a civil cause of action for an
invasion of privacy, NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-201 (Reissue 2007), while the Maine
legislature has made it a criminal offense to intentionally access a computer re-
source without authorization, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 432 (2006).
146. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626.
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dress via his personally-owned Blackberry, can the employer then ac-
cess the e-mails stored on that Blackberry?  These problems, and
others like it, demonstrate the need for the courts to be clear on what
is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. Privacy Policies Are Not Sufficient to Define Employees’
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
One of the potential problems in Quon was that the City’s privacy
policy for its employees did not explicitly cover the text messaging
pagers.147  The official privacy policy involved in Quon—“Computer
Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy”— suggested, at least on its face,
that it was inapplicable to the text messages in question.148  Whether
or not this policy extended to the text messaging pagers was a factual
issue: the City claimed it had an official meeting and e-mailed an offi-
cial memorandum informing its employees that the policy did cover
the text messaging pagers.  Despite this alleged warning, Quon
claimed that his supervisor told him he would not audit the text
messages as long as Quon paid any overage fees.149
A clearly stated privacy policy can help form an employee’s expec-
tation of privacy.150  In Quon, the Court stated, “[E]mployer policies
concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable expec-
tations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies
are clearly communicated.”151  However, considering how fast technol-
ogy changes, employers’ privacy policies will not always be able to
keep up with the technology used in the workplace, as evidenced in
Quon.152  If courts are clear about what reasonable expectations of
privacy employees have, state employers will know what to cover in
their privacy policy statements.  This, however, requires the courts to
make clear statements in the first place.
Alternatively, if an employer does not have a usage monitoring pol-
icy, employees need a clear statement on what can and cannot be reg-
ulated.153 As the Court stated in O’Connor, “the absence of such a
policy does not create an expectation of privacy where it would not
otherwise exist.”154  This means that courts need to be very clear on
exactly where individuals have an expectation of privacy, regardless of
whether individual employers have privacy policies.  A bright line rule
stating the Fourth Amendment does apply to the content of govern-
147. Id. at 2625.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 2631.
151. Id. at 2630.
152. 130 S. Ct. 2619.
153. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 728 (1987).
154. Id. at 719.
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ment employees’ electronic communications will help government em-
ployers, employees, and lower courts.
C. Despite the Court Claiming It Did Not Discuss the
Reasonableness of the Privacy Interest, It Actually
Did So in Its Discussion of the Reasonableness
of the Search
The Supreme Court will abstain from deciding constitutional is-
sues unless it is absolutely necessary to do so in the determination of
the case.155  In accordance with that principle, the Court in Quon de-
termined it was unnecessary to decide whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in employer-provided electronic communication
devices.156  In Quon, the Court declined to analyze Quon’s expectation
of privacy in his text messaging pager, but instead went directly to an
analysis of the reasonableness of the City’s search.157  Though the
Court was attempting to avoid an unnecessary analysis of the reason-
ableness of an employee’s privacy interest, it actually did discuss this
interest in its discussion of the reasonableness of the employer’s
search.158  The Court stated: “[T]he extent of an expectation is rele-
vant to assessing whether the search was too intrusive.”159  In the
analysis of whether the search was reasonable, the Court actually did
analyze whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, with-
out actually investigating the extensive issues that such analysis
would require.
Because the Court addressed the reasonableness of Quon’s privacy
interest in the content of his text messages, it missed a good opportu-
nity to clarify a bright-line rule to show the Fourth Amendment al-
ways applies in like situations.  The Court recognized “[f]rom OPD’s
perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy expec-
tation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the
risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s
life.”160  From the Court’s perspective, the extent of an employee’s pri-
vacy interest in a device is a factor in whether the employer’s search is
reasonable.  But the Court failed to inquire into Quon’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the device his employer searched, leaving this
factor uninvestigated.  The Court still used what it called a limited
privacy expectation in determining whether the search was reasona-
ble, though there was no discussion of what this privacy expectation
155. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207, 209 (1960).
156. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2631.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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actually entailed.161  A more thorough discussion of the privacy expec-
tation would have been helpful in analyzing the reasonableness of the
City’s search.  Courts must take into account the reasonableness of
the privacy interest in discussing the reasonableness of the search at
issue because the reasonableness of the search is, in part, determined
by the extent of the privacy interest.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Quon highlighted the fact that,
while the majority opinion claimed to limit the discussion to the rea-
sonableness of the search, the majority actually applied the plurality’s
test of reasonableness from O’Connor: “Despite the Court’s insistence
that it is agnostic about the proper test, lower courts will likely read
the Court’s self-described ‘instructive’ expatiation on how the
O’Connor plurality’s approach would apply here . . . as a heavy-handed
hint about how they should proceed.”162
D. The Supreme Court Should Have Adopted a Bright-Line
Rule Applying the Fourth Amendment to All Government
Employees’ Electronic Communications
To determine whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred, all
communications, be they oral, in letter form, or electronic, should be
treated the same.  In Quon, the Court declined to discuss the privacy
interest because, in part, the role of emerging technology is still un-
clear.163  However, the Court should not decline to discuss expectation
of privacy in a piece of technology just because the technology is
new.164  As Justice Scalia noted technology is constantly changing and
the Court should not use its evolving nature as an excuse to avoid
finding a single, workable objective test for communication devices.165
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t would be foolish to con-
tend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technol-
ogy.”166 Technology will continue to advance in the future.  The Court
cannot delay all determinations of privacy issues indefinitely.  Today,
electronic communications have expanded to the point of replacing so-
called “snail mail.”  Because electronic communication has become so
important in everyday life, the Court should make a definitive state-
ment as to what expectation of privacy individuals have.  By applying
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. See id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
164. In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether the use of heat-sensing technology on a criminal suspect’s
home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 29–30.
There, the Court did examine the use of a relatively new technology and ex-
amined a reasonable expectation of privacy involving that technology. Id. at 40.
165. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring).
166. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34.
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the same standard the Court has applied in the past, that individuals
have an expectation of privacy in the content of communications but
not the addressing information,167 the Court will remain consistent in
its Fourth Amendment analysis and also give a clear message to lower
courts and government employers about what searches are
constitutional.
1. Lay People’s Views of What Is a Reasonable Search Can Help
Inform Courts’ Analyses of Reasonable Expectations
In analyzing new technology, however, the Court may need to look
to other sources to  determine the expectation of privacy that society is
willing to view as reasonable.  Social science research has attempted
to demonstrate whether the Court’s own evaluation of what society is
willing to recognize as reasonable actually corresponds to what indi-
viduals say they are ready to recognize as reasonable.
Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher asked participants
to rank the “intrusiveness” of fifty searches the Court has analyzed in
the past, and then compared those intrusiveness ratings to what the
Court determined.168  Searches included “looking in foliage in public
park,” “going through garbage in opaque bags at curbside,” and “moni-
toring phone for 30 days.”169  Participants generally agreed with the
Court on searches the Court saw as clearly a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment, and on those searches the Court saw as
clearly not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.170  For
searches the Court did not see as easy to determine, however, partici-
pants often disagreed with the Court’s final outcome.171  Most telling
for future analyses like Quon, on average participants rated the “mon-
itoring phone for 30 days” as the second most intrusive search, more
intrusive than “perusing bank records,” “needle in arm at work to get
blood,” and even “reading a personal diary”—all searches that have
been held to violate the Fourth Amendment.172  Because participants
see a search of electronic communication as highly intrusive, this
shows private citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
these communications at least equal to, if not more than, the expecta-
tion of privacy in sealed letters.  Although this example was of a police
search and not an employer search, the same finding would likely ex-
tend to employer searches.  Assuming a “highly intrusive” act impli-
167. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
168. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Pri-
vacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Under-
standings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
169. Id. at 738–39 tbl.1.
170. Id. at 739.
171. Id. at 741.
172. Id. at 738–39 tbl.1.
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cates a reasonable expectation of privacy, because participants viewed
surveillance of a phone as one of the most intrusive searches in the
study, electronic communications should be afforded Fourth Amend-
ment protection from government employer searches.
Jeremy Blumenthal, Meera Adya, and Jacqueline Mogle decided to
extend Slobogin’s findings and investigate what factors related to
these searches made them seem more intrusive.173  They used the
same fifty scenarios from Slobogin’s study, and presented them to par-
ticipants either describing the target of the search or without men-
tioning the target.174  For example, the researchers presented the
description of the search “flying 400 yards over backyard in helicop-
ter” with the target of “marijuana” and “reading a personal diary”
with the target of “embezzlement.”175  In some cases, giving the con-
text (the potential target of the search) made participants see the
search as less intrusive, which courts use in their analysis of whether
the search was reasonable.176  If a bright-line rule were used, the rea-
sonableness of the search, in light of the circumstances of the particu-
lar search, would still depend on the object of the search.  This study
demonstrates that lay people consider the object of the search in their
reasonableness analysis.  The bright-line rule, then, would keep
courts’ analyses in line with what society already views as reasonable.
Social scientists have also examined how employees feel about em-
ployer surveillance and search of communications.  Although these
studies do not reference the Fourth Amendment, they can be applied
to determine if society is willing to view the search as reasonable.
Bradley Alge studied how electronic surveillance of employees’ In-
ternet usage affected employees’ views of their employers.177  The
scope of the search compared to what the employer was trying to find,
and employees’ cooperation and assistance in the search both reduced
employees’ perceptions that their privacy had been invaded.178  Em-
ployers can make sure to keep their searches relevant and allow indi-
viduals to participate, which will reduce employees’ negative emotions
toward the perceived intrusion.179  A bright-line rule applying the
Fourth Amendment to all government employees’ electronic communi-
cation would allow these factors and circumstances surrounding em-
ployers’ searches to come into play in the second step of the analysis in
determining the reasonableness of the search.
173. Jeremy A. Blumenthal et al., The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay
“Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331 (2009).
174. Id. at 343.
175. Id. 356–60 tbl.1.
176. Id. at 353.
177. Bradley J. Alge, Effects of Computer Surveillance on Perceptions of Privacy and
Procedural Justice., 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 797 (2000).
178. Id. at 802.
179. See id.
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2. A Bright-Line Rule Is Necessary to Guide Lower Courts
With the increasing prevalence of electronic communication de-
vices,180 lower courts will most likely be faced with searches of em-
ployer-provided devices.  Without clear guidance from the Supreme
Court, lower courts will not know what analysis to apply.  Lower
courts will be lacking in guidance of how to conduct a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy analysis for these situations, or even when it is
proper to conduct that type of analysis.  In performing the two-step
reasonable expectations analysis, lower courts have no guidance in de-
termining what exactly society is ready to view as reasonable.  This
lack of guidance could result in vast discrepancies among jurisdictions
of what actually is  a reasonable expectation of privacy in an em-
ployer-provided electronic communication device.
3. A Bright-Line Rule Applying to All Communication Is
Necessary Because There Is No Real Distinction
Between the Different Types of
Communication
The Court should apply a bright-line rule that treats the content of
all communications the same.181  The standard first applied in 1877 in
Ex parte Jackson,182 that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information they take steps to keep hidden from third par-
ties, but not in information that is shared with others,183 is a worka-
ble test that can be applied to all types of information.  There is no
reason to distinguish letters and telephone conversations from e-
mails, text messages, and other forms of electronic communication.
The “content” information of these communications is kept private
from other individuals, while the “coding” information, the address or
phone number to which the communication is sent, is not.
Government employees take steps to keep the content of their text
messages private from third parties.  If the employee did not have an
expectation of privacy in the content of the message, then there are
other forms of communication—i.e., talking on a police radio or in per-
son—that the employee could have used.  The government employee,
by using a text message, selected a form of communication that cannot
be overheard or intercepted by anyone except the intended recipi-
180. See supra section III.A.
181. See also Ariel D. Cudkowicz et al., Technology and Privacy in the Workplace:
Monitoring Employee Communications After the Supreme Court’s Quon Decision,
54 BOS. B.J. 29, 29 (2010) (commenting that many court-watchers had hoped the
Supreme Court would establish a bright-line rule regarding government searches
of text messages in City of Ontario v. Quon).
182. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
183. Id. at 733.
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ent.184  Because Courts have applied the Fourth Amendment to less
private forms of communication, such as oral communications,185 that
could be overheard by others, the same analysis should hold true for
text messages.
4. The Coding vs. Content Distinction Should Hold True For
Government Employers’ Searches
The coding vs. content distinction was originally applied in police
searches of criminal subjects, and not government employers’ searches
of their employees’ communications.186  But the Court was clear in
O’Connor that government employees do not lose a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy merely because they have chosen to work for a public
employer.187  The distinction that courts have consistently applied to
police searches should also apply to government employer searches.
By applying the Fourth Amendment, the Court recognizes that the
individual who was searched has a liberty interest in remaining free
from searches and seizures that outweighed the government’s interest
in searching.  In government employers’ searches of employees’ elec-
tronic communications, the interest in the search is to monitor the em-
ployees’ use of the electronic communication medium.188  Normally,
the government employer is not searching for a suspected crime or
wrongdoing, but is only looking to determine whether the employee is
using the device for work related purposes.189  The government em-
ployer’s interest, then, is actually less than the interest police have in
searching electronic communications for evidence of criminal acts.
The government employees’ liberty interest is to have only the in-
tended recipient view the content of those communications—the same
liberty interest at issue for the communications in police searches.190
The coding vs. content distinction, which courts have applied when
balancing a state’s interest in searching criminal suspects, should ap-
ply to government employers’ searches when the state’s interest is ac-
tually less.  A bright-line rule applying the Fourth Amendment to all
government employees’ electronic communication would recognize
that the liberty interest does outweigh the government employers’ in-
terest in monitoring their employees’ communications.
184. Of course, the intended recipient is always able to relay the contents of the infor-
mation to a third party.  This argument only applies to government searches of
the text messages without the consent of either the sender or the intended
recipient.
185. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
186. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
187. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
188. See, e.g., Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 2009).
189. Id. at 321.
190. Smith, 442 U.S. at 738.
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5. Potential Downfalls Do Not Outweigh the Utility of a Bright-
Line Rule
One potential counterargument to applying the coding vs. content
distinction is government employees do not actually take steps to keep
the content of their text messages or other electronic communications
hidden from others.191  Unlike a letter, text messages cannot be
“sealed” from prying eyes.  Text messages, however, are still more pri-
vate than other forms of communication, such as oral communication
or telephone calls, which a third party could always overhear.  With-
out knowledge of encryption, technology does not provide users a way
to seal the content of their text messages.
Another potential argument is that, unlike the content of letters or
telephone communications, the content of text messages are already
shared with third parties because the service provided stores the con-
tent of the messages on their servers.192  Text message users, how-
ever, do not necessarily share the content of their information with
third parties.  There is a difference between voluntarily sharing the
content of a message with a third party and a third party having the
ability to access that information.193  Cell phone service providers do
not have someone constantly monitoring the content of all of their cli-
ents’ text messages.  The only way the content of a message will be
shared with a third party is if the service provider prints off the tran-
script of the text messages.
Despite these counterarguments, the bright-line rule stating the
Fourth Amendment applies to the content of government employees’
text messages, but not the coding information, is the best, most worka-
ble rule.  This rule is easy to apply to a variety of fact patterns involv-
191. This issue was discussed in United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
In Katz, the Court pointed out that “one who occupies [the phone booth], shuts
the door behind him, and pays the toll permits him to place a call is surely enti-
tled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world.”  Id. at 351.  It may be argued that, because text messages could be
“hacked” into or otherwise intercepted without special encryption technology, the
sender has not actually “shut the door behind him” to prevent others from receiv-
ing the message.
192. In United States. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), the Supreme Court stated
that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information
they voluntarily share with third parties.
193. The Sixth Circuit recently made a similar argument in United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).  In Warshak,, the Court distinguished the normal
application of the third-party doctrine and the sharing of e-mail messages with
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) because the information conveyed to the ISP is
not information meant to be further put to use by the ISP. Id. at 274. But see
Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier
of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 186 (2010)
(arguing that courts should apply a rule distinguishing between coding and con-
tent information for data stored on cellular phones, but recognizing that data
stored with third-party servers would pose a different question).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB204.txt unknown Seq: 26 30-NOV-11 8:10
584 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:559
ing government employers’ searches of their employees’ electronic
communications.194  Any other standard applied would result in in-
consistencies in lower court decisions and confusion for government
employers attempting to search their employees’ communications.
E. Using the Bright-Line Rule, Quon Would Have Come Out
the Same
If the Supreme Court had chosen to address the issue of Quon’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages he sent over
the pager, the Court would have had to include the coding vs. content
distinction in their analysis.  For Quon, the text messages he was
claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy in were content informa-
tion.  The City had obtained a printout of the content of the text
messages Quon had sent using the pager.195  If the Court applied the
coding vs. content distinction that courts have used in the past, Quon
would be more likely to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of those text messages than the numbers to which he had sent
messages using the government-provided pager.
This distinction can also help aid government employers when they
make their privacy policies or plan to search employees’ devices.  Pri-
vacy policies should make explicit that the content of an employees’
communications are subject to review by employers.  If the employer
does not have a privacy policy, or is worried that the privacy policy
will not override a reasonable expectation of privacy, the employer can
stick to searches of the “addressing” information—the numbers dialed
or from which the employer received calls or text messages, or e-mail
addresses—to avoid a Fourth Amendment search and seizure issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion examined the Supreme Court’s decision
in Quon and its potential effect on future determinations of reasonable
expectation of privacy issues.  The Supreme Court was able to avoid
determining whether a public sector employee has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in an employer-provided communication device be-
cause the search itself was reasonable.  The Court should have
adopted a bright-line rule recognizing that individuals have a differ-
ent expectation of privacy in the content of their communications than
they do in the coding, or addressing, information.  Such a bright-line
194. See Daniel Zamani, There’s an Amendment for That: A Comprehensive Applica-
tion of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 169, 181 (2010) (arguing the coding and content distinction should be ap-
plied to government searches of SmartPhones because it is the easiest standard
to apply to a variety of situations).
195. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
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rule would hold the Fourth Amendment applies to government em-
ployers’ searches of the content of government employees’ electronic
communications.
The increasing prevalence of electronic communication devices in
general, and employer-provided devices in particular, will necessitate
the determination of the reasonableness of employees’ privacy expec-
tations.  Employers will need guidance as to what searches they can
and cannot perform, employees will need guidance as to what their
employers can do, and lower courts will need guidance in adjudicating
these issues when they arise.  A bright-line rule holding the Fourth
Amendment applies to the content of government employees’ elec-
tronic communications would aid government employers, government
employees, and the lower courts.
